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Abstract 
The ‘right to be forgotten’ (RTBF) is an emerging 
concept that refers to an individual’s ability to have 
data collected about themselves permanently deleted 
or “destroyed”—the final stage of the information 
life cycle. However, we do not yet understand where 
RTBF fits into existing theory and models of privacy 
concerns. This is due, at least in part, to the lack of 
validated instruments to assess RTBF. Therefore, 
following the methodology detailed by MacKenzie et 
al. [1], this paper develops scales to measure 
individuals’ concerns about the RTBF. We validate 
the scale and show that the RTBF represents a 
separate dimension of privacy concerns that is not 
reflected in existing privacy concerns instruments.    
 
1. Introduction  
 
The explosive growth of ‘Big Data’ and the 
‘Internet of Things’ means that ever more data about 
individuals is being collected, aggregated, and 
analyzed. Therefore it is not surprising that 
consumers have expressed an interest in being able to 
delete some of that information [2, 3]. For example, a 
recent national survey found that 88% of Americans 
supported a federal law mandating a right to delete 
their personal information that was collected and 
stored by organizations [2]. A similar poll in the EU 
reported that 75% of respondents wanted the ability 
to delete personal information [3]. In response, in 
2014 the European Union Court of Justice ruled that 
Google had to provide some form of a RTBF to 
European consumers [4]. In the USA, California 
passed a law (SB 568) that provides a limited form of 
a RTBF to minors [5]. 
This desire for a RTBF is especially relevant for 
social networking sites, as evidence grows about the 
potential harm (e.g., loss of employment or education 
opportunities) resulting from information individuals 
posted about themselves [6, 7]. In response to this 
growing interest, Facebook allows users to delete 
their own profiles and search history [8]. Indeed, 
there is evidence that people are increasingly 
attempting to take control of their personal 
information that is posted on social networking sites 
[9], but are hampered in doing so because manual 
procedures are error-prone and tools are difficult to 
use [10]. Consequently, businesses have emerged 
(e.g., reputation.com) to perform such services. 
However, attempting to monitor and defend one’s 
online reputation is a reactive strategy that does not 
eliminate the potentially harmful information. Hence, 
consumer interest in a RTBF that would provide a 
more proactive strategy for managing one’s online 
reputation. Indeed, the proximate impetus for 
establishing a RTBF in the EU stems from the desires 
of a Spanish citizen to restrict access to outdated 
information about the person’s financial history [4]. 
The EU court acceded to those concerns by requiring 
Google to block that information from appearing in 
response to searches executed against the individual. 
However, because the information can still be 
accessed from the websites of the news organizations 
that originally published the stories, the court’s ruling 
essentially provides for a right to be “de-indexed” (so 
that it does not appear in Google search results) 
rather than a pure right to delete information [11].  
Although there has been much debate about the 
RTBF [6, 11-19], those discussions focus on 
questions of cost, feasibility, and likely impact on 
freedom of expression and the future development of 
the Internet. Scant attention has been paid to the 
relationship of the RTBF to consumers’ privacy 
concerns. This is an important gap, given that the 
RTBF is intended to increase individuals’ ability to 
protect their personal data. 
Interestingly, existing instruments designed to 
measure privacy concerns [20-23] do not explicitly 
address the topic of data deletion. One explanation 
for this may be that these instruments were developed 
prior to the phenomenon of ‘Big Data’, when 
companies were still concerned about the cost of 
storage. Nevertheless, it is possible that the concerns 
that gave rise to the call for a RTBF are implicitly 
reflected in one or more of the existing scales. For 
example, the desire to be able to delete outdated 
information that is no longer relevant may be an 
aspect of wanting to control how one’s personal 
information is used or part of concerns about being 
able to correct errors in that data. Both control and 
errors are aspects of the existing privacy concerns 
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scale [22, 24]. However, it is also possible that 
attitudes about the RTBF are not represented in 
existing measures of privacy concerns. 
The question of whether the RTBF is already 
addressed in existing privacy concerns instruments or 
is a heretofore-neglected dimension of privacy is 
important because privacy concerns affect consumer 
intentions and behaviors [25-27]. Moreover, firms 
can choose to adopt a number of different attitudes 
toward the protection of consumer privacy [28] and 
can use privacy as a strategic competitive weapon  
that may enable them to charge higher prices [29]. 
Thus, if existing instruments omit an important 
dimension of privacy concerns, research results may 
be misleading and firms may make erroneous 
decisions. Consequently, our research questions are: 
How should RTBF be measured? and How does the 
RTBF relate to previously identified dimensions of 
privacy concerns? 
To answer that question we follow MacKenzie et 
al.’s [1] prescriptions for construct development and 
develop and validate a scale to measure consumer 
attitudes about the RTBF. We then empirically test 
the relationship between RTBF and previously 
validated dimensions of privacy concerns.  
 
2. Literature Review  
 
Belanger and Crossler [30] and Smith et al. [31] 
reviewed and analyzed more than two decades of 
research on privacy. They note that one topic that has 
received considerable attention is the development of 
instruments to measure privacy concerns. However, 
although much progress has been made, an editorial 
that accompanied those two reviews identified the 
need to more precisely specify the nature of the 
construct privacy concerns [32, p. 984].  
Subsequently, Hong and Thong [24] examined 
the questions used in prior research on privacy and 
validated a model in which individuals’ privacy 
concerns consist of the following six dimensions: 
1. Awareness that personal data is being collected 
and how it will be used 
2. Collection of personal data   
3. Control over the use of personal data 
4. Secondary use and sharing of personal data with 
other entities   
5. Protection of personal data from improper access 
6. Errors in personal data and the ability to correct 
them 
Collectively, the six dimensions address issues 
related to the acquisition, use, and storage of 
individuals’ personal information, but say nothing 
about its disposal. This is surprising because the 
concept of the right to delete one’s personal 
information has been discussed in legal journals [33], 
popular books [34], and privacy frameworks [35]. 
For example, Generally Accepted Privacy Principles 
[35] Principle 5 is titled “Use, Retention, and 
Disposal of Information” and recommends that 
“personal information is retained for no longer than 
necessary to fulfill the stated purposes [for which it 
was originally collected]” (section 5.2.2) and that 
“personal information no longer retained is 
anonymized, disposed of, or destroyed in a manner 
that prevents loss, theft, misuse, or unauthorized 
access” (section 5.2.3). Privacy advocates similarly 
stress the need for “end-to-end” protection of privacy 
throughout the entire information life cycle and the 
use of secure procedures to destroy personal 
information once it is no longer needed [36, 37]. 
Clearly, consumers are interested in some form of 
RTBF as a means to augment their ability to protect 
their personal data. Therefore, the question is whether 
those interests are reflected in the existing scales used 
to measure privacy concerns, or need to be added to 
those instruments. As previously mentioned, none of 
the six primary dimensions of privacy concerns 
explicitly mention deletion of data. Nevertheless, it is 
possible that one or more of the existing dimensions 
subsumes that issue.  
The first two dimensions, awareness and 
collection, focus on the initial acquisition of personal 
information and, therefore, clearly do not address the 
issue of a RTBF. However, dimension three, control 
over how collected data is used, could possibly be 
interpreted as encompassing not just the processing 
of that data, but also its retention and disposal. 
Indeed, as previously noted, Generally Accepted 
Privacy Principle 5 addresses “use, retention, and 
disposal” of information. Nevertheless, examination 
of the specific questions used to measure control 
suggests otherwise. Two questions ask if it “usually 
bothers” the respondent when they “do not have 
control of personal information that I provide” and 
when they “do not have control or autonomy over 
decisions about how my personal information is 
collected, used, and shared”, and the third question 
asks if the respondent is “concerned when control is 
lost or unwillingly reduced as a result of a marketing 
transaction” [24, p. 298]. Thus, it does not seem that 
any of the questions used to measure the “control” 
dimension of privacy concerns explicitly refer to the 
topic of the RTBF. 
The fourth privacy concern dimension is 
secondary use. At first glance, this appears to at least 
partially address the issue of a RTBF, especially 
given that the case that triggered the EU’s decision to 
create a RTBF revolved around the fact that outdated 
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and, therefore, arguably irrelevant information about 
past financial conditions continued to appear in 
Google search results. However, the three questions 
used to measure concern about “secondary use” 
discuss concern about websites to which personal 
information is given using that information for 
unanticipated reasons, or selling it or sharing it with 
other entities [24, p. 297]. The EU case involving the 
Spanish citizen, however, dealt with information that 
was originally reported by news organizations, which 
then subsequently was indexed by Google not 
information provided by the data subject. Thus, it is 
not clear whether the existing questions about 
“secondary use” do address the RTBF. 
Dimension five deals with concerns about 
improper access to stored personal information. 
Given the seemingly never-ending revelations about 
breaches that create the risk of identity theft, such 
concerns could indeed be a motivation for wanting to 
be able to delete information that entities store about 
oneself. However, although concern about protecting 
stored information may contribute to a desire for a 
RTBF in order to protect that data, it is not clear that 
the two constructs are identical. 
Dimension six deals with concerns about errors in 
the data. The questions used to assess this dimension 
ask if the respondent is concerned that websites “do 
not take enough steps to make sure that my personal 
information in their files is accurate,” “do not have 
adequate procedures to correct errors in my personal 
information,” and “do not devote enough time and 
effort to verifying the accuracy of my personal 
information in their databases” [24, p. 298]. Those 
questions certainly are related to the concerns in the 
EU case that outdated and, therefore, irrelevant 
information about past financial history was returned 
in Google searches. However, as with concerns about 
secondary use and improper access, although 
concerns about errors may contribute to the demand 
for a RTBF, it is not clear that they are identical 
concepts. 
Thus, it is not clear whether the six dimensions in 
existing instruments designed to measure privacy 
concerns address the issue of the RTBF. Therefore, 
we developed a scale designed to specifically address 
the RTBF and then empirically tested whether those 
questions load on one or more of the existing six 
dimensions of privacy concerns or represent a 
heretofore-overlooked dimension of privacy. 
 
3. Methodology  
 
We followed the methodology outlined by 
MacKenzie et al. [1] to develop a valid instrument 
(see Figure 1). In the results section we report the 
results for completing the first five phases (Steps 1-9 
in Figure 1) of that process. In total, we conducted 4 
separate data collections that were administered to 
various combinations of business school students and 
Amazon Mechanical Turk workers. Each subsection 
describes specific measures and populations for that 
phase of the project. 
 
 
Figure 1. Instrument Development Process [1, p. 297] 
 
4. Results 
4.1. Conceptualization  
  
Figure 1 shows that the first step in developing a 
new instrument entails developing a conceptual 
definition of the construct.  We began by reviewing 
the discussions about the RTBF in the popular press 
and the academic literature. Based on our review of 
that literature we posit the following definition: 
The RTBF applies to individuals. It is a 
feeling that reflects the desire to be able to 
delete personal information stored by other 
entities and accessible from the Internet. 
We suggest that the RTBF applies both to 
information that was directly provided by the 
individual [9, 17, 33, 34] and to information about an 
individual that was originally generated by others [4]. 
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Prior research on privacy concerns has shown that 
those concerns vary in intensity depending upon the 
nature of the specific information in question (e.g., 
personal behaviors, beliefs, financial, health, etc.) 
[30, 31]. Discussions of the RTBF suggest that it, too, 
would vary depending upon the nature of the 
information in question. For example, the EU court 
case that requires Google to comply with the RTBF 
specifically involves financial information that is 
dated and, therefore, arguably irrelevant [4]. 
Similarly, discussions about the desire to delete 
social media posts focus on potentially embarrassing 
behaviors and statements of opinion [6, 9]. 
MacKenzie et al. [1, p. 302] note that constructs 
are not inherently formative or reflective, but that the 
way in which they are treated depends upon how the 
researcher conceptualizes the construct. The six 
previously validated dimensions of privacy concerns 
have been conceptualized as unidimensional 
constructs and, therefore, measured with a set of 
reflective indicators [24]. As noted earlier, those six 
dimensions address the acquisition, use and storage 
of personal information. The RTBF addresses 
concerns about the final stage of the information life 
cycle: disposal. Therefore, for purposes of testing 
whether the RTBF is already captured in the existing 
dimensions of privacy concerns, we treat it as a 
unidimensional construct and propose to measure it 
with a set of reflective indicators.  
  
4.2. Development of Measures  
 
Steps 2 and 3 entail creating items to measure the 
construct and assessing their content validity. 
Because the RTBF has not been previously 
measured, we created six initial items while drawing 
from the most recently validated instrument [24] for 
all other privacy concern items: awareness (AWA), 
controls (CON), secondary use (SEC), errors (ERR), 
accuracy (ACC), and collection (COL).  
 
4.2.1 Content Adequacy Test 
 
We then followed MacKenzie et al.’s [1, p. 304] 
recommended content adequacy test for assessing the 
content validity of the items by creating a matrix in 
which the columns represented different constructs 
and the rows represented items.  
In our case, the matrix had seven columns, one 
for each of the previously validated dimensions of 
privacy concerns and one for the RTBF construct. 
The top row in each of those columns contained a 
definition of the construct. An eighth column, 
unlabeled, at the far left of the matrix contained 
individual question items in each row. The rows in 
the matrix contained the new items we created to 
measure the RTBF and the prior-validated items for 
the other six dimensions of privacy concerns.  
We asked participants to rate, on a scale of 1-5, 
how well each item fit each dimension. Next, we ran 
a repeated measures analysis of variance (rANOVA) 
to analyze each individual survey item to see if it 
rates significantly highest on its own sub-construct by 
examining a contrast comparison between the 
intended sub-construct and all others. If the 
difference is statistically significant, then the content 
is valid and the item is more likely to demonstrated 
discriminant validity [38].  
Two content adequacy tests were performed on 
our six new items as well as the existing 18 items 
from the most recently validated privacy concerns 
scale [24]. To our knowledge, this is the first time 
that the privacy concerns scale has been analyzed 
using the content adequacy test. Because of the high 
cognitive load of rating each item across each sub-
construct (7 x 24 = 168 questions), we made three 
versions of the survey that each included a random 
selection of 8 of the 24 items to rate across the sub-
constructs. The survey also included the actual 
privacy concerns instrument after the content 
adequacy test for a total of 80 items plus 
demographic questions. The results were then 
combined into a single data set. The results of the 
first data collection included 800 responses from 
university students in the business college of a large 
public university in the western United States. 
However, 231 responses were removed for being 
incomplete, incorrectly answering trap questions, 
straight-lining, or taking very little time to complete 
the entire survey, resulting in 569 usable responses. 
 
4.2.2. Content Adequacy Test Results 
 
Table 1 summarizes the results, which were 
mostly positive with some exceptions. The gray 
shaded cells indicate an item loading significantly 
higher on its own intended construct than all others. 
The black cells with white text indicate problems 
with an item. First, RTBF3 did not load significantly 
higher on the RTBF construct than on CON. 
Therefore, it was removed from subsequent data 
collections. However, the five remaining items were 
valid. Interestingly, one of the existing scale items for 
the sub-construct AWA and another for COL did not 
pass the content adequacy test even though they were 
copied directly from past research [22, 24]. AWA3 
did load highest on its own factor, but that loading 
was not significant in the rANOVA. COL3 did not 
even load highest on its own sub-construct.  
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 Table 1. Results of First Content Adequacy Test 
 
RTBF ACC AWA COL CON ERR SEC 
RTBF1 3.97 3.11 3.24 3.17 3.77 2.78 2.89 
RTBF2 3.98 3.03 3.33 3.16 3.78 2.81 2.94 
RTBF3 3.89 2.91 3.36 3.05 3.83 2.70 2.89 
RTBF4 3.94 3.04 3.28 3.08 3.68 2.76 2.88 
RTBF5 4.15 2.98 3.50 3.18 3.66 2.86 2.93 
RTBF6 4.07 2.95 3.56 3.14 3.76 2.87 2.82 
ACC1 3.01 3.98 3.30 3.01 3.29 2.68 3.32 
ACC2 3.05 4.04 3.32 2.92 3.23 2.49 3.14 
ACC3 3.14 3.99 3.60 3.22 3.46 2.76 3.51 
AWA1 3.16 3.29 3.76 3.15 3.38 2.81 3.24 
AWA2 3.02 3.34 4.03 3.23 3.63 2.68 3.52 
AWA3 3.04 3.36 3.67 3.63 3.64 2.80 3.23 
COL1 3.13 3.29 3.34 3.90 3.36 2.61 3.08 
COL2 2.96 2.87 3.16 3.63 3.25 2.44 3.02 
COL3 3.32 3.20 3.70 3.63 3.54 2.84 3.22 
CON1 3.38 3.24 3.54 3.40 4.11 2.83 3.20 
CON2 3.23 3.31 3.60 3.57 4.10 2.68 3.60 
CON3 3.07 3.35 3.50 3.16 3.82 2.88 3.24 
ERR1 2.94 3.28 3.07 3.35 2.80 3.82 2.77 
ERR2 2.75 3.14 2.91 3.22 2.77 3.87 2.64 
ERR3 2.76 3.29 3.18 3.27 2.81 3.85 2.72 
SEC1 3.49 3.37 3.45 2.67 3.54 3.17 3.94 
SEC2 3.42 3.21 3.39 2.50 3.42 3.08 3.97 
SEC3 3.59 3.34 3.61 2.70 3.80 3.24 3.93 
  
 Therefore, to further contribute to the body of 
research on the privacy ,s instrument, we made slight 
modifications to those existing scales (the entire scale 
is found later) and executed another content adequacy 
test. In the second round of testing, we collected 269 
responses (238 usable) from Amazon Mechanical 
Turk and only included AWA3, COL3, and 6 other 
randomly selected items to keep the survey length 
comparable to the prior data collection. The 
ANOVAs revealed that our changes to AWA3 and 
COL3 improved them enough to rate significantly 
highest on their own intended sub-constructs (p < 
0.001). Therefore, we conclude that our scale 
(including the five remaining RTBF items created for 
this study) has sufficient content validity. 
 
4.3. Model Specification 
 
Step 4 in the instrument creation process involves 
specifying the formal measurement model. In the 
most recent privacy concerns instrument validation, 
Hong and Thong [24] found evidence of a third order 
privacy concern factor with two second-order factors 
among the 6 prior sub-constructs. Figure 1 visualizes 
the model specification they selected after testing 12 
alternatives.  
 
COL1
COL
SEC
CON
ERR
ACC
AWA
COL2
COL3
SEC1
SEC2
SEC3
CON1
CON2
CON3
ERR1
ERR2
ERR3
ACC1
ACC2
ACC3
AWA1
AWA2
AWA3
Interaction 
management
Information 
management
Privacy 
concerns
 
Figure 1. Privacy Concern Model [24] 
 
An important aspect of this research is to discover 
where RTBF fits within this existing privacy concern 
model. Therefore, after the RTBF scale is validated, 
we will examine whether it fits best as: 1) a reflection 
directly from the third order privacy concern factor, 
2) a reflection of the second order interaction 
management factor, 3) a reflection of the second 
order information management factor, or 4) an 
entirely separate factor from privacy concern. 
 
4.4. Scale Evaluation and Refinement 
 
Steps 5 and 6 of the instrument creation process 
entail collecting data to pretest the instrument and 
then using those results to purify and refine the 
instrument, respectively.  
Before the two content adequacy tests described 
previously, we executed a pilot test which led to 
several important changes even before the content 
adequacy tests began. In addition, the entire privacy 
concerns scale was measured during each content 
adequacy test for a total of three unique pilot tests.  
With each pilot test, we performed a covariance-
based structural equation modeling tool. Table 2 
summarizes the samples and CFA results of each 
pilot test. The results indicate adequate fit [1, 39]. 
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Table 2. CFA results for each pilot tests 
 Pilot 1 Pilot 2 Pilot 3 
n 224 569 238 
Source AMT students AMT 
CMIN/df 2.082 1.918 2.002 
NFI .860 .924 .875 
CFI .964 .962 .933 
PRatio .826 .757 .826 
RMSEA .070 .042 .071 
 
The following statistics were calculated solely 
for the last pilot test. Reliability for each scale was 
analyzed by measuring Cronbach’s alpha for each of 
the sub-dimensions and was well-above the 0.7 
threshold, ranging from 0.87 to 0.93. 
To evaluate the reliability of each individual 
scale item, we examined the significance of the 
estimate (λ) of the relationship between an indicator 
and the latent construct. All items were significant. 
Convergent validity was analyzed by calculating 
the average variance extracted (AVE) for each first-
order reflective sub-construct. All AVEs were well-
over the 0.50 recommended cutoff [40], ranging from 
0.76 to 0.86. The second order privacy s construct 
was also above the cutoff at 0.78. Convergent 
validity for this data was sufficient. 
Discriminant validity was analyzed by 
examining whether the average variance explained 
(AVE) by the indicators for their underlying latent 
constructs is greater than the squared correlation 
between the focal construct and the other sub-
constructs [40]. The results indicated sufficient 
discriminant validity as all AVEs for each sub-
construct were greater than their squared correlations 
with other sub-constructs.  
In summary, we conclude that the pilot data—
after accounting for the changes made during the 
content adequacy tests—exhibits sufficient reliability 
to proceed with final data collection. 
 
4.5. Validation  
 
Validation of the refined scale (steps 7 through 9 
in the instrument creation process) includes the 
collection of new data, validation of the scale with 
the new data, and cross-validation from different 
populations [1].  
The final data collection was based on a combined 
sample of 331 AMT workers and 78 students. As 
with the pilot data collections, responses sets were 
removed if participants: 1) straight-lined responses, 
2) missed any of the four trap questions, or 3) spent 
less than 1/3 of the median time taking the survey. As 
usual, all latent construct items were completely 
randomized across all constructs and sub-constructs. 
This resulted in a total of 324 completed response 
sets. Demographic questions concerning age, current 
residence, ethnicity, and education were included at 
the end of the survey.  
Because no changes were made to the scales after 
the third pilot test, the data were combined for a total 
of 552 response sets. The participants were 57 
percent male and an average of 35 years old. Six 
percent were drawn from people currently living 
outside of the US. 77 percent of respondents were 
Caucasian, 6 percent African American, 3 percent 
Hispanic, and 11 percent Asian. On average, 
participants had earned at least a 2-year degree. 
 
4.5.1. Final Measurement Model 
 
The scale validity statistics were slightly 
improved over the pilot tests. The CFA produced the 
following results: CMIN/df = 2.733, NFI = 0.951, 
CFI = 0.968, PRatio = 0.826, and RMSEA = 0.056. 
Reliability for each sub-construct was high with 
Cronbach’s alpha ranging from 0.84 to 0.92. All scale 
item estimates (λ) were significant. All AVEs 
exceeded 0.50 [40], ranging from 0.75 to 0.84. Also, 
all AVEs exceeded the squared correlation of each 
sub-construct with every other sub-construct. In 
summary, the final data set indicated strong 
reliability and validity. Table 3 lists the final 
measurement scale including both the RTBF items. It 
should also be noted that the items AWA3 and 
COL3, while drawn from prior research [24], were 
updated in this study based on the results of the 
content adequacy tests (see Table 1). 
 
Table 3. Final Privacy Concerns Scale Including RTBF 
ACC1: I am concerned that company or government agencies 
do not protect my personal information from unauthorized 
access. 
ACC2: I am concerned that companies or government 
agencies do not devote enough time and effort to preventing 
unauthorized access to my personal information. 
ACC3: I am concerned that companies or government 
agencies do not take enough steps to make sure that 
unauthorized people cannot access my personal information 
in their computers. 
AWA1: I am concerned when a clear and conspicuous 
disclosure is not included in the privacy policies of companies 
or government agencies. 
AWA2: It usually bothers me when I am not aware or 
knowledgeable about how my personal information will be 
used by companies or government agencies. 
AWA3: It usually bothers me when companies or government 
agencies do not tell me the way the data are collected, 
processed, and used. 
COL1: I am concerned that companies or government 
agencies are collecting too much personal information about 
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me. 
COL2: It usually bothers me when companies or government 
agencies ask me for personal information. 
COL3: When companies or government agencies try to 
collect my personal information, I sometimes hesitate to 
provide it. 
CON1: It usually bothers me when I do not have control of 
personal information that I provide to companies or 
government agencies. 
CON2: It usually bothers me when I do not have control or 
autonomy over decisions about how my personal 
information is collected, used, and shared by companies or 
government agencies. 
CON3: I am concerned when control is lost or unwillingly 
reduced as a result of a marketing transaction with 
companies or government agencies. 
ERR1: I am concerned that companies or government 
agencies do not take enough steps to make sure that my 
personal information in their files is accurate. 
ERR2: I am concerned that companies or government 
agencies do not have adequate procedures to correct errors 
in my personal information. 
ERR3: I am concerned that companies or government 
agencies do not devote enough time and effort to verifying 
the accuracy of my personal information in their databases. 
RTBF1: I am concerned that companies or government 
agencies do not allow me to delete information I've given 
them. 
RTBF2: It usually bothers me that companies or government 
agencies don't offer a process for me to request deletion of 
information I've given them. 
RTBF4*: I am concerned that companies or government 
agencies may not honor my requests to delete information 
I've given them. 
RTBF5*: It usually bothers me that companies or government 
agencies do not give me the option to have my information 
deleted. 
RTBF6*: I am concerned that companies or government 
agencies may not be capable of deleting my information 
when I request that they do so. 
SEC1: I am concerned that when I give personal information 
to a company of government agency, the entity would use 
the information for other reasons. 
SEC2: I am concerned that companies or government 
agencies would sell my personal information to other 
companies. 
SEC3: I am concerned that companies or government 
agencies would share my personal information with other 
entities without my consent. 
Note: *RTBF3 was removed based on the content 
adequacy test. All remaining RTBF items are valid. 
However, to reduce survey fatigue, we recommend 
retaining RTBF4, RTBF5, and RTBF6 which exhibited the 
best discriminant validity. Bolded terms (AWA3 and COL3) 
represent modified versions of previously validated 
questions that improved the performance of the content 
adequacy test. 
 
4.5.2. Determining Model Specification 
 
After confirming the measurement scale validity 
and reliability statistics for the new RTBF scale 
(along with the other six privacy concern sub-
constructs), we next seek to determine the most 
appropriate model specification. In particular, we 
next examine model fit statistics with four alternative 
models (depicted in Figure 2) of how the RTBF could 
relate to the previously validated structure of privacy 
concerns [24]. 
 
COL SEC CON ERR ACCAWA
Interaction 
management
Information 
management
Privacy 
concerns
RTBF
Model A
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management
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management
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Figure 2. Alternative Model Specifications 
 
Model 1 treats the RTBF as entirely separate 
from privacy concerns. Model 2 includes RTBF as a 
sub-construct of the second order factor interaction 
management. Model 3 includes RTBF as a sub-
construct of the second order factor interaction 
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management. Model 4 includes RTBF as a reflection 
directly from the third order privacy concerns factor. 
Table 4 summarizes the model fit statistics for each 
version of the models in Figure 2.  
 
Table 4. Fit Statistics across Models 
 1 2 3 4 
CMIN/df 2.882 2.932 2.909 2.914 
NFI 0.958 0.945 0.945 0.945 
CFI 0.972 0.963 0.963 0.963 
PRATIO 0.743 0.801 0.801 0.801 
RMSEA 0.058 0.059 0.058 0.058 
 
Based on the fit statistics in Table 4, each model 
of privacy concerns demonstrates good fit. Therefore, 
it appears that the RTBF is indeed related to the other 
six dimensions of privacy concerns, but the exact 
nature of that relationship needs further investigation. 
 
5. Discussion and Conclusion 
 
Prior research on privacy has established that 
people are concerned about being adequately aware 
of the information being collected about themselves, 
the amount and nature of the information that is 
collected, the degree to which they can control what 
organizations do with their information, secondary 
use and sharing of that information, the ability to 
correct errors in information stored about them, and 
the security of that information. This study 
investigated whether those six dimensions of privacy 
concerns also subsume the recent interest in the 
ability to delete personal information, referred to as 
the RTBF, or if the RTBF is a separate construct. 
We followed recommended procedures 
MacKenzie et al. [1] to develop and validate a set of 
five questions to assess an individual’s feelings about 
the RTBF. We then included those five questions 
along with previously validated questions about the 
six existing dimensions of privacy concerns and 
administered the instrument to both AMT workers 
and students. Our results show that the RTBF is a 
separate construct that is distinct from the existing six 
dimensions of privacy concerns.  
Thus, our results indicate that existing measures 
of privacy concerns do not incorporate people’s 
concerns about the RTBF. Therefore, research about 
the antecedents and outcomes of privacy concerns 
may not necessarily apply to the RTBF. 
Consequently, organizations should not assume that 
their existing privacy strategy [e.g., 41] adequately 
addresses consumers’ feelings about the RTBF. A 
reasonable explanation for our findings regarding 
RTBF is that the phenomenon of interest is emergent 
and not fully calibrated into the experiences of 
everyday life.  Similarly, it was not long ago that 
being in possession of a social media profile was a 
non-topic to begin with.  
Nevertheless, the RTBF is highly correlated with 
existing dimensions of privacy concerns. One likely 
explanation is that all seven constructs deal with an 
individual’s personal information that is stored with 
various organizations. However, the RTBF appears to 
be distinct from the six dimensions of privacy 
concerns identified by prior research. This may 
reflect a critical difference in the temporal relevance 
associated with those seven constructs. Some of the 
other six dimensions of privacy concerns represent 
factors that have immediate bearing on decisions 
about whether to disclose or share information: To 
what extent do I feel adequately aware that 
information about me is being collected (AWA)? 
How comfortable am I in disclosing specific types of 
information (COL)? How secure will that 
information be (ACC)? Other questions have 
delayed, but still relatively short-term relevance: 
How might my information be subsequently shared 
(SEC)? Will I be able to correct errors (ERR)? How 
much control will I be able to exert over what the 
organization does with my information (CON)?     
In contrast, the RTBF is likely to become 
relevant only at some time in the future, when 
someone is contemplating changes in behavior or 
status. This is important because psychology research 
shows that people tend to focus primarily on 
foreseeable and imaginable costs and benefits when 
making decisions, and ignore or grossly underweight 
factors that are not relevant until much later [42, 43]. 
For example, although people may be able to weigh, 
with varying degrees of accuracy, the costs and 
benefits of adopting a health-related behavior, it is 
much more difficult to accurately consider the 
difficulty of changing that behavior at some 
unspecified time in the future [43]. Our results 
suggest that it may be the same with decisions about 
the disclosure of personal information: the immediate 
and short-term costs and benefits are evaluated 
separately, yet related to, the possibility of wanting to 
delete that information at some later time. If so, just 
as research on the use of IT has had to expand 
beyond the study of initial adoption and explicitly 
address issues of discontinuance [44, 45], privacy 
research must explicitly address not only decisions 
about whether to disclose personal information, but 
also explicitly investigate what prompts people to 
desire to discontinue such disclosure.  
As with any research, it is important to 
acknowledge this study’s limitations. Some may 
criticize a reliance on students and AMT respondents 
in our pilot studies.  As this work progresses forward, 
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some redress of this will be undertaken with a more 
robust and diverse sampling. However, recent 
research has indicated that AMT participants 
classified as “master workers” (which was the case in 
this study) are at least as valid as those collected from 
professional data collection services [46, 47].  
Additionally, we have not yet tested the 
nomological relationship between RTBF, privacy 
concerns, and other factors. We have also not 
resolved the question of how the RTBF relates to the 
other six dimensions of privacy concerns: all four 
models we tested fit the data well. Furthermore, we 
have not yet examined how attitudes about the RTBF 
differ across types of information. Consumers have 
different levels of privacy concerns for different 
types of information [48, 49]. Consequently, it is not 
surprising that there is some evidence that European 
consumers’ requests to apply the EU’s recently 
established RTBF to have Google delist search 
engine results focus on some types of information 
more than others [50]. However, there are many other 
relevant forms of information that consumers may 
want deleted besides that which Google indexes (e.g., 
private social media posts restricted to friends, 
Internet of things data, mobile device sensory data, 
etc.). Therefore, additional research is needed to 
more fully understand how consumers’ feelings about 
the RTBF vary across types of information besides 
that which shows up in search engines. Such research 
may help resolve the ongoing heated debates about 
whether the RTBF conflicts with first amendment 
rights (c.f. [14] versus [51]) because they want to 
censor news stories about themselves or whether they 
are more interested in being able to control retention 
and storage of personal information they post on 
social media and that businesses collect about their 
online behaviors. We plan to address all these issues 
in subsequent work. 
In conclusion, this study developed and validated 
a set of questions that can be used to assess a 
person’s feelings about the RTBF. Those feelings are 
related to, but distinct from, previously validated 
dimensions of privacy concerns.  
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